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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GORGOZA, INCORPORATED,
a corporation; and JAMES
B. CONKLING and DONNA D.
CONKLING, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No. 14351

-vsSTATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages for the claimed
breach of an alleged contract which the defendant, Utah
State Road Commission (now Department of Transportation)
allegedly entered into with appellants and which is supposedly
incorporated in the Order of Immediate Occupancy of June 7,
1971.

Said Order of Immediate Occupancy was entered in a

separate eminent domain proceeding wherein the State Road
Commission condemned approximately eight acres of plaintifff s land for highway use.

Plaintiffs also alleged that

defendant, State Road Commission, created a defective, unsafe
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and dangerous condition of a highway and other public improvements causing plaintiff injury.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed by an Order of
the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, Jr«, Judge, granting defendant, State Road Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Motion was granted

on the grounds that no binding agreement or enforceable contract existed between the parties and that the State had
not waived its immunity from suits of this kind. (R-133)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the trial court
decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since appellant's Statement of Facts contains many self
serving statements as well as inaccurate and non essential
items, respondent does not accept said statement as proper
and will, therefore, set forth its own as follows:
Immediately prior to June 7, 1971, an action to condemn approximately eight acres of land from appellants was
initiated by respondent in the Third District Court for
Summit County.

Subsequent to the filing of the action ap-

pellant's counsel, Robert F. Orton, was asked to accept service by Leland D. Ford, Assistant Attorney General, to en-
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able the State to advertise the project at a:i early i: -<•>,
(R. 76)
A proposed Order of Immediate Occupancy v - submitted to Mr. Orton by Mr. Ford for review,

(R. 80-86)

Said proposed Order contained the standard routine language
typical of other Orders of Immediate Occupancy.

(R. 106)

Mr. Orton stated that he wanted some changes in the language
of the proposed Order and submitted a proposed Order with
the changes incorporated in it. The changes involved mainly
an amplification of the recognized obligation of respondent
to provide access during construction, a requirement to provide at least three openings in the right-of-way fence and
a provision calculated.

enjoin each of the parties from

interfering with each other in their respective uses of their
property.

(See R. 87-93 for comparison with R. 80-86)

Since the proposed language was considered, accepts:-iv
the proposed Order prepared by Mr. Orton was submitted to
Judge Maurice Harding who signed i+-, thus making it the Order
of the Court.
A contract for construction >t tin: project was awarded
to W. W. Clyde & Company by respondent on July 1, 19 71.
59).

Construction commenced in August of 1971.

\R.

By November

15/ 1971/ the right-of-way fence was constructed across ap-
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pellant's frontage, three access openings had been left in
the fence at the locations designated by appellant and a
paved approach had been constructed from respondent's highway across the frontage road to appellants property.

Prior

to the construction of the paved approach, access was afforded
to appellant's property at all times from the highway.

(R. 60)

During the Fall of 1971, the contractor began construction of a cattle guard located on the east edge of appellant's
parking lot.

Due to weather limitations in the Fall of 1971,

this cattle guard was not completed that year and a temporary
ky Pass was constructed.

(R. 60)

Appellant contacted Governor Rampton and complained
about problems with access on or about September 24, 1971?
(R. 21)

It is alleged by appellant that this was for "emer-

gency aid."

(Appellant's Statement of Facts, Page 5)

It

is a fact that no attempt was made by appellant or his counsel
to contact counsel for respondent prior to this so called
"emergency."

On September 28, 1971, a meeting was held with

Blaine J. Kay, Director of Transportation and other officials
of the respondent, State Road Commission.

(R. 21, 41-45)

Subsequent to the September 28, 1971, meeting an access was constructed to appellant's "middle entrance" as
requested.

(R* 48)

This did not satisfy appellant apparent-
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ly and subsequent to another Complaint by appellant, Conkling
to Mr. Kay on November 2, 1971, (R. 50) Mr. Kay directed on
November 10, 1971, that the access be paved.
was accomplished November 15, 1971.

(R. 51)

This

(R. 60)

Gorgoza elected not to open for its winter operation
in 1971.

(R. 52)

In the summer of 1972, the "frontage road"

in front of appellant1s property was completed and paved and
approaches constructed through the right-of-way line to appellant's parking lot.

(R. 60-61)

Appellants alleged that liability insurance was cancelled on November 11, 1971, since they were not ready for
inspection due to the access problem.

(R. 22)

This is dis-

puted and respondent's allege that access was only one of
many problems leading to cancellation of liability insurance
coverage, none of which were the fault of respondent.

(R. 61)

The fact is that the access problem, if indeed it ever was a
problem, was corrected November 15, 1971.
No notice was ever received from appellant subsequent
to November 15, 1971, concerning an intention or desire to
re-open the resort by respondent and it remains closed to
this date.
A letter dated July 21, 1972, (R. 21-23) was sent by
appellant's counsel, Robert F. Orton, to respondent's attorney,
Leland D. Ford, which alleged violation of the Order of Im-
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mediate Occupancy.

However, it was October 24, 1972, be-

fore an Order to Show Cause was issued concerning the alleged violation by respondent of the provisions of the
Order of Immediate Occupancy*

(Re 94, 95)

Since the

condemnation trial was imminent at that time and it was
thought that a settlement could be reached of all outstanding issues, a stipulation was entered into on October 27th
providing that the matter of damages for the alleged breach
could be heard at a later date.

(R. 96, 97)

Subsequently, on or about November 6, 1972, a stipulation was reached which partially settled the condemnation
suit between the parties„

(R. 78)

among other things for a reservation

Said stipulation provided,
of any rights to claim

additional compensation arising out of the alleged violation
by respondent of the Order of Occupancy.
Appellants brought suit against respondent on February
8, 1974, in this matter.

(R. 1)

The parties subsequent to discovery filed Motions for
Summary Judgment on the issue of whether the Order of Occupancy on June 7, 1971, constituted a valid contractual obligation binding on the State of Utah.

(R. 119-120; 128-129)

The Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., after adopting
the parties stipulated facts granted the respondent, State
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Road Commission's Motion for Summary Judgment,

The court

further dismissed plaintiff's entire Complaint, including
the negligence count with prejudice and plaintiff has now
appealed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURTS RULING WHICH DISMISSED PLAINTIFFfS COMPLAINT
IS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.
Each of the parties submitted Motions for Summary Judgment prior to trial based on the question of whether a contract existed between the parties arising out of the Order
of Immediate Occupancy of June 7, 1971, and events leading
to its entry.

The court ruled on this point in favor of

respondent, Road Commission, and ordered Judgment of Dismissal against appellants.

Respondent submits

this Judg-

ment is correct and that same should be sustained.
A.

THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO BIND THE STATE ROAD
COMMISSION TO AN AGREEMENT NOT OTHERWISE BINDING
IS CORRECT.

Appellants theory that the negotiating of the terms of
the Order of Occupancy of June 7, 1971, created a binding contract, the breach of which gives rise to an action for damages
was rejected by the court below.

The main reason for the re-

-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jection of this theory was the holding of the court in
the case of State Road Commission v. Bates, 20 U.2d 175,
435 P.2d 417.

This case was an action by the State to

condemn land for a highway*

The landowners had prior to

the action conveyed property to the State by deed and
alleged that an agent of the State Road Commission promised them that the State would get water to their remaining land since the non-access fence on the right-of-way
line cut off their remaining land from the stream where
stock could water previously.

The State denied the allega

tion but the court arranged for defendants to repay the
money and litigate that issue.

They, in fact, did not do

so, but the court in commenting about this stated the following:
'.

' • ' • • • :

I I

•
•

"-'
•

•

•

•

•

•

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

•

...

v

.

• _

:

•

•

Counsel for the landowners
cite as authority for the validity of the claimed promise the
first sentence in Section 254f
Public Officers, as found in
43 Am.Jur. 71, but neglected
to cite other parts in the section. So far as material here,
that section reads:

l

When power or jurisdiction
is delegated to any public officer over a subject matter,
and its exercise is confided
to his discretion, the acts
done in the exercise of the
authority are, in general,.
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binding and valid as to the
subject matter. The only
questions which can arise
between an individual and
the public or any person
denying their validity,
are power in the officer
and fraud in the party.
* * * An officer can, however, bind his government
only by acts which come
within the just exercise
of his official powers and
within the scope of his authority, unless the government
held out the officer as having
authority to do the acts. An
unauthorized act or declaration of an officer does not
estop the government from insisting on its invalidity,
(emphasis supplied) . . . "
The logical extension of the appellant's argument
would be to say that any Order of Immediate Occupancy
creates a "contract" and a breach would give rise to a
cause of action notwithstanding governmental immunity.

For

instance assume that the language of the Order of Immediate
Occupancy were decided upon between the landowner or his
counsel on one hand and the judge on the other, while the
condemning agency representative remained silent.
create a contract?

Does this

If so, who is bound by it? A logical ex-

tension of plaintiff's theory would say that a contract is
created.

The absurdity of plaintiff's argument is obvious

and should be rejected.

Respondent submits that the most

obvious reason for concluding that there is not an agreement
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is that no matter how much negotiating is done over the
language to be submitted to a court for a proposed Order,
the court can and frequently does change the language and
the final result is a "court order/' not an agreement.
To constitute an agreement to fit appellant's theory
the respondent supposedly received a benefit of such proportion that it became consideration for an agreement which
would not otherwise existc

What was this "benefit?" Sup-

posedly it was the lack of necessity to serve the defendants with process and the resultant ability to proceed with
awarding a contract.
fit*

It is submitted this hardly is a bene-

The contract could have been let with a provision re-

stricting the contractor from working on appellant's property until it was obtained at a later time/ so there was
little,'if any^ benefit.

The statute allows service on the

clerk of the court where the defendants are non-residents
also.

To say this is sufficient to create a contract with

the resulting burden which appellant urges is really dificult,
if not down right impossible to accept.
Most contracts are formed because the parties intended
to form a contract.

There must be present the essentials

a contract such as consideration, mutuality, etc.
for the mutual benefit of the parties.

of

It is usually

An analysis of the in-

stant case reveals no apparent intention on the part of re-
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spondent to "form a contract" and little mutuality.

Counsel

for the State requested appellant's counsel to accept service, a request which is not uncommon.

Appellant's counsel

requested modification in the language of the proposed Order
of Immediate Occupancy, again not an uncommon request. Assume that the request of respondent's counsel or of appellant's counsel, either one, occurred without the other, would
there be an agreement?

Does the fact that these independent

requests were coincidental constitute an agreement?

Respondent

submits that the real question is what did the parties intend?
Counsel for appellant may have intended this to be a "contract,"
but such was not the intent of respondent's counsel. Nothing
of the sort was discussed at the time and since respondent's
counsel cannot intentionally bind the State without authorization, it is inconceivable that he can unintentionally bind the
State as would have to be the case in this instance.
B.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY CANNOT BE WAIVED BY
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.

This court has recently stated that only the legislature can waive sovereign immunity.

The case of Bailey Ser-

vice & Supply Corp. v. State Road Commission, (1975) 533
P.2d 882, wherein the court states the following in commenting on the abortive attempt of the State Road Commission to
waive sovereign immunity in that case:
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I I

'

•

• •

.

•

•

•

•

•

'

'

"

.

.

-

.

:

,

..........

Early in the proceedings the
State Road Commission entered
into a stipulation with the
plaintiff which purported to
waive governmental immunity.
The stipulation was disavowed,
and the State defended on the
ground that the State was immune from suit. Only the legislature can waive sovereign immunity and the Road Commissions
attempt to do so was without
legal effect. . . . "
(emphasis supplied}
If by the simple act of stipulating to alternative
language in a proposed Order of Immediate Occupancy an
attorney for the Road Commission (now Department of Transportation) can create a contract binding on that agency
which has the effect of waiving the cloak of sovereign immunity, then it means an agent can do something the parent
agency cannot do.

Add to that the fact the agent did not

seek or obtain any permission to create a contract and it
becomes obvious that it is even more difficult to accept
appellant*s theory that a contract was created.
The Governmental Immunity Act found in Title 63,
Chapter 30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and specifically
Section 63-30-4, makes the act exclusive as to waiver,
that section reads in part as follows:
11

. . . wherein immunity from
suit is waived by this act,
consent to be sued is granted.
•t
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This court has stated in the case of Hansen v, Barlow, 23
Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 (1969), the following proposition:
11

. . . the Attorney General,
in the absence of express legislative restriction to the contrary, may exercise all such
power and authority as the public interest may from time to
time require. In short, the
Attorney General's powers are
as broad as the common law unless
restricted or modified by statute.
•

• •

ti

But for the pre-emption of waiver powers which the
legislature obviously intended when they passed the governmental immunity act, supra, the Attorney General under commonlaw powers could presumably have waived governmental immunity.
It logically follows that since the Attorney General cannot
directly waive governmental immunity, a waiver cannot be effected indirectly either.
C.

'":

THE ROAD COMMISSION (DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION)
HAS NOT RATIFIED TEE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BY ITS
ACTIONS.

Appellant argues that respondent, State Road Commission,
has "adopted and ratified" the alleged agreement of the parties entered into on June 7, 1971, when the Order of Occupancy
was issued by the court.
Respondent denies most vigorously that its actions in
response to the Order of Immediate Occupancy amount to a ratifica
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tion of an alleged agreement between the parties.

The Order

of Immediate Occupancy required the respondent to provide
"reasonable access."

(R. 5)

Respondent's actions were nothing

more than an attempt to comply faithfully with the Order of
the Court and to require its contractor to comply as well.
This is standard practice since those within the Department
realize the legal consequence of a denial of access.
The respondent understands the consequences of a failure to comply with the provisions of an Order of Immediate
Occupancy.

The fact that the taking of or denial of access

can result in the payment of substantial damages is reason
enough to justify all of respondent, Road Commission's, actions
in this case.

.

-

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that an agreement
was reached between counsel for the parties, and assuming
that this was an unauthorized act by an agent of the State in
line with the Bates case, supra, and further assuming that ratification of this agreement is not (1) required to obtain occupancy of the property and (2) removes a protection against liability otherwise afforded, is it reasonable to assume that the
respondent would act to ratify this so called agreement?
answer has to be an emphatic, No!

The

On the other hand, would it

be reasonable to expect the respondent, Road Commission, to react as it did in order to comply with a court order?
obviously, yes.
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The answer is

Respondent submits that the actions it took should
be viewed in the light of what is reasonable.
One further comment should be made concerning the
word "agreement."

Appellant argues that the "agreement"

of the parties was admitted in the answer filed by the
defendant, State Road Commission.

The agreement was as

to language in a proposed order to be submitted to the
court for review and approval.

It is submitted that one

can agree without making a "contract."

The dictionary de-

fines the word agreement as follows:
" (l)a. The act or fact of agreeing; b. harmony of opinion, action
or character: concord; (2)a. an arrangement as to a course of action;
b. compact, treaty; (3)a. a contract
duly executed and legally binding;
b. the language or instrument embodying such a contract." (Webster1s
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary)
The parties obviously attach a different meaning to
the word "agreement."
binding contract.

Appellant construes it as a legally

The respondent construes it as "an arrange-

ment as to a course of action/1 to wit, the proposal of language to a court for the creation of and issuance of a court
order.
POINT II
THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE LANGUAGE IN
A PROPOSED ORDER OF OCCUPANCY DOES NOT CREATE A "CONTRACT"
AND IN ANY EVENT, CONSIDERATION IS INADEQUATE.
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A.

THE TERMS OF AN ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY
ARE ULTIMATELY DECIDED BY THE COURT.

Plaintiff's contention is that there is a contract
existing between the parties to provide "reasonable access"
to plaintiff's property during the course of construction,
which is supported by the consideration of plaintiffs agreeing to proceed with the Order of Occupancy without the necessity of serving all the parties personally, in return for
the State's agreement to incorporate the suggested language
of plaintiff which deals with the question of access*

Defend-

ant's position is that there cannot be any "contract11 for a
number of reasons:
Section 78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states in
part:
". . . Upon the filing of
a petition for immediate occupancy the court shall fix
the time within which, and
the terms upon which, the
parties in possession shall
be required to surrender
possession to the plaintiff*
it

•

• *

- -

*-

Nowhere in the statutes dealing with eminent domain,
is there a legal requirement imposed upon a condemning authority to provide access.

However, the legal affect of deny-

ing access is that the condemning authority must pay damage
for the diminished value occasioned by the denial of access.
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It has been the custom of the Road Commission to seek an
Order "pendente lite11 authorizing the Road Commission to
enter into possession of the property while the question
of damages and/or the value of the taking is reserved for
a later proceeding.

It has become somewhat customary for

courts to grant these orders of occupancy routinely upon
the request of the Road Commission and they are seldom contested.

The State has a set proposed Order containing stand-

ard language previously used and approved by many state courts
which is routinely submitted to a court for entry which provides, among other things, for reasonable access.

On numer-

ous occasions, when there are special problems or when counsel
for defendant landowners request changes, or the court in some
instances on its own volition elects to, these orders are
changed as far as the language is concerned in various ways.
In the case which forms the basis for this suit, a request
was made by defendant's counsel of plaintiff's counsel to accept service so that the court could proceed with an immediate
hearing, obtain an Order of Occupancy and advertise the project
for bid.

The routine Order prepared by the State was submitted

to plaintiff's counsel for review.

Plaintiff's counsel there-

upon submitted the Order incorporating the changes which the
plaintiff desired.

Defendant's counsel reviewed the language

contained in the proposed Order prepared by plaintiff's counsel
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and approved the entry of said Order upon stipulation, and
the court then made it an Order.

Defendant does not consider

that anything was "given up" as far as the language of the
Order of Occupancy is concerned.

The Court simply chose to

adopt as its Order the agreed language submitted by the parties which amplifies the language already proposed by counsel
for the State.
B.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION IN THE
ALLEGED AGREEMENT OF JUNE l t

1971, TO BIND

THE STATE IN ANY EVENT.
The Court found thatf
11

. . c There was insufficient consideration in
the alleged agreement incorporated within the Order
of Occupancy of June 7, 1971f
to bind the State and thus,
constitute a contract, in
any event." (R. 131}
The consideration which supposedly supports the agreement between the parties is the acceptance of service in the
eminent domain action by counsel for appellants without the
necessity of serving the appellants, in return for the alleged concession of the respondent in agreeing to modified
language in the Order of Immediate Occupancy.
This "consideration" is illusory for at least three
reasons as follows: (1) Neither parties* acts constituted a
legal detriment of sufficient proportion to be considered as
i
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the equivalent of a legal consideration.

The respondent,

State Road Commission, agreed to modified language in a
proposed court order not significantly different from that
proposed originally.

(Compare R. 4-6 with R. 24-26).

The

appellant allegedly gave up the right to be served with process and allegedly waived objections to the proposed location of the new highway.

(R. 76). The fact is that counsel

for respondent requested that counsel for appellant accept
service of process to enable the hearing on the Order of Immediate Occupancy to proceed.

Appellants were never requested

to "give up the right to contest the location of the highway"
as appellants assert in their brief.

(P. 11)

This assertion

is absolutely untrue and was never the subject of discussion
between counsel for the parties.

The acceptance of service

and a stipulation to permit an Order of Immediate Occupancy
to be entered does not waive any rights to contest the location of the highway.

It is true that when the appellant later

withdrew the money deposited with the clerk pursuant to statute,
the appellant then waived all rights to contest the location
of the highway and was only entitled to seek compensation for
the taking and resulting damages.

This, however, is due to

the fact that the law so provides, (78-34-9) Utah Code Annotated,
1953, and not because appellant was requested to abandon a legal
right.

(2)

If appellant's assertion is correct, to wit, that
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it "gave up certain rights," then the consideration only runs
one way since respondent has never asserted or considered
that it "gave up anything" in the events leading up to the
entry of the Order.
spondent receive?

(3)

How much benefit, if any, did re-

The answer is, virtually nothing; the re-

spondent was excused from having to serve process on defendants residing outside the State.

The law, however, in Sec-

tion 78-34-9, would have allowed the State to serve notice
on the clerk of the court and proceed with a hearing after
the minimum notice period.

Realistically, it is submitted

that this is hardly adequate consideration for an agreement
with the legal consequences which appellant asserts.
POINT III
IF A CONTRACT WAS "CREATED" BY THE ORDER, IT IS
INCOMPLETE AND APPELLANT'S RELIEF WOULD BE LIMITED AND
MAY HAVE BEEN WAIVED.
A.

THE ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY IS INCOMPLETE
REGARDING RELIEF FOR VIOLATION OF THE ORDER AND
THE AWARD OF MONEY DAMAGES URGED BY APPELLANT
IS NOT PROPER.

Assuming for purpose of argument, that a contract was
"created" on June 7, 1971, by the events surrounding the entry
of the Order of Immediate Occupancy, then the contract is the
Order itself.

(
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The Order or "contract" does not provide for an award
of money damages in the event it is not complied with by its
terms.
The Order of Occupancy, itself, provides for injunctive
relief and this is all the relief that plaintiff is entitled
to.

The court may award damages under a contempt proceeding*

Section 78-32-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads as follows:
"If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action
or special proceeding, prejudicial to his rights therein,
is caused by the contempt, the
court, in addition to the fine
or imprisonment imposed for the
contempt or in place thereof,
may order the person proceeded
against to pay the party aggrieved
a sum of money sufficient to indemnify him and to satisfy his
costs and expenses; which order
and the acceptance of money under
it is a bar to an action by the
aggrieved party for such loss
and injury*"
It would appear from the foregoing Section that the
court would be the one to make inquiry as to whether or not
there was a contempt within the purview of the Order of Occupancy and if so, award damages if it so determined, however, it would appear that this proceeding would be improper
before a jury.
The Order of Immediate Occupancy is further deficient
as a "contract" in that no time limits are set regarding when
actions must be completed.
-21-
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B.

APPELLANT'S RELIEF, IF ANY, WAS INJUNCTIVE IN
NATURE AND WAS WAIVED BY FAILURE TO INSIST ON
ENFORCEMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED INJURY.

Assuming further for the sake of argument that in
addition to the formation of a contract by the events of
June 7, 1971, the respondent breached the contract, then
pursuant to the terms of the agreement the relief was injunctive in nature.
In analyzing this problem the question arises, when
did the breach occur if it, in fact, occurred?

The answer

is, sometime after August of 1971, when construction commenced and July of 1972, when the frontage road was completed?

(R. 60)

Since appellant elected to seek relief

from this "alleged breach" by contacting the Governor and
the Director of the then Department of Highways, rather than
seeking injunctive relief as the "agreement" (alleged) provided, they waived any possible right they had for injunctive relief.

It is true that an injunction was sought in

October of 1972, when appellant filed an Order to Show
Cause.

(R.94, 95)

By stipulation the parties agreed that

the allegations raised therein could be heard independently
at a future time.

(R. 96, 97)

This is not an admission by

respondent that any rights, in fact, existed.
Respondent submits that the failure of appellant to
request injunctive relief at the time of the alleged breach
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is in effect a waiver of any right to the protection or relief afforded by a finding of contempt by a court. A subsequent determination by the court that the Order of Immediate Occupancy was breached at a previous time does not
entitle the court to award appellant damages when the appropriate relief at the time of the injury would have been to
issue an Order to respondent requiring compliance with the
previously issued Order of Immediate Occupancy.

Only the

continued non-compliance of respondent to the court's specific
directive would give rise to an award of money damages.
The appellant alleges it was damaged on November 11, 1971,
when its insurance was canceled allegedly because of access
problems.

(R. 22) The fact that nothing was done until October/

1972, when the Order to Show Cause was filed, raises serious
question as to the truth or validity of appellant's allegations
regarding damages.

The fact is the appellant should be estop-

ped from asserting any claim for injunctive relief simply because of this unreasonable delay in enforcing its alleged rights
and without a right to secure injunctive relief, damages obviously cannot be awarded.
It is stated in 42 Am. Jur.2d 1108, Section 307 under
the title "injunctions" as follows:
" . . . It has been held, however,
that after the need for injunctive
relief has ceased, the court cannot
retain, for the assessment of damages, an action to enjoin the continuance of trespasses and to abate
a nuisance causing substantial dam-
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. age, where the defendant would not
be liable for such damages in an
action at law." (Citing Hennessy v.
Boston, 26 Mass. 559, 164 N.E. 470
62 A.L.R. 780)
It is submitted that the same rule should apply in
this case and that the appellant should not be permitted to
recover damages under an injunctive action filed after the
work is completed when the law would not permit him to recover
in an action at law.
'•- C.

- '

RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE TO APPELLANT IN ANY
EVENT SINCE UNDER PRINCIPLES OF EMINENT DOMAIN
LAW TEMPORARY IMPAIRMENT OF ACCESS IS NOT COMPENSIBLE.

, ..;•.,:;: . •••

In the eminent domain proceeding involving these parties, the respondent acknowledges the obligation it had to
provide appellant with "reasonable access."

It is, however,

unrealistic to assume that with the amount of construction required that there would not be periods of time when the access
would be impaired or somewhat temporary in nature.

Respondent

and its contractor made every reasonable effort to maintain
the access particularly in the early months of the project
prior to the time appellant closed its restaurant facility
and elected not to open its winter operation. (R. 52)

(The

restaurant closed when the contractor terminated its operations in the Fall of 1971.)
The law recognizes the fact that some temporary injury
may result, but that it is generally not compensable, for in-
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stance, the California Supreme Court in the case of People
v. Ayon, 352 P.2d 519 (California I960), stated the general
rule regarding this issue and some of the policy reasons for
the rule:
"Temporary injury resulting
from actual construction of public
improvements is generally non compensable. Personal inconvenience,
annoyance or discomfort in the use
of property are not actionable types
of injuries. It would unduly hinder
and delay or even prevent the construction of public improvements to
hold compensable every item of inconvenience or interference attendant
upon the ownership of private real
property because of the presence
of machinery, materials and supplies
necessary for the public work which
have been placed on streets adjacent
to the improvement."
(Page 525)
It should be noted that in the Ayon case there was a
taking of a portion of defendant's property and the defendants
were attempting to recover additional damages as a result of
inconvenience during construction.
Other cases which have generally reached the same conclusion are the following:
Commonwealth Department of Highways
v. Ray, 392 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1965)
Rymkevitch v. State, 249 N.Y.S. 2d
514 (Court of Claims 1964)
Frankline Gas Company v. O'Brien, 171
N.E.2d 45 (111. 1961), wherein the court
stated the following:
" . . . defendant's witnesses conceed that the interference is tempor-
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ary and, this being so, would
not have the effect of permanently depreciating the value
of the land not taken. It has
. long been settled that temporary consequential interference
with the use of property occasioned by the construction of
a public improvement is not a
proper element of damage."
Other cases are:
- Liebarger v. State Department of
Roads, 128 N.W.2d 132 (Neb. 1964)
Masheter v. Yate, 224 N.E.2d 540
(Ohio 1967)
In effect, plaintiff is seeking to recover damages
under his "contract theory" when the law would otherwise deny
him recovery.

Most of the cases which have been decided in

this area recognize that often there are very real and substantial damages and Nichols on Eminent Domain states the
following:
"This rule is hard to
defend on principle. But the
impossibility of constructing
a subway or sewer or laying a
water pipe in the streets of
the business section of a city
without in some degree interfering with access to abutting
property, and the consequent
danger of a multiplicity of
suits from the determination
of which it might be impossible
as a practical matter to exclude mere damage to business,
have led the courts to reject
claims of this character as a
matter of public necessity."
(2-a Nichols Eminent Domain Section 6.4442(2) revised 3rd Edition
1975)
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POINT IV
THE COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
AS TO OTHER MATTERS.
A.

RESPONDENT'S WRONGFUL ACTS, IF ANY, DO NOT
CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF IMMUNITY UNDER THE
SECTION OF THE ACT WHICH DEALS WITH UNSAFE
OR DANGEROUS HIGHWAYS.

Appellant's second count in its Complaint alleged
that respondent, Road Commission, created a "defective, unsafe and dangerous condition of a highway, structure and other
public improvemt" all to the plaintiff's damage, it relies on
Section 63-30-8, and language therein as authority for the
non-application of governmental immunity*
Respondent submits that the court correctly dismissed
this count along with the contractual theory urged by appellant.

Respondent submits that the record has several refer-

ences in it to inadequate "commercial access" according to
appellants.

(R. 48 - R. 50). Even respondents Director,

Blaine J. Kay, recognized this problem and directed corrective
action on November 10, 1971.

(R. 51)

was completed on November 15, 1971.

This corrective action
(R. 60)

Appellants do

not spell out what the "defective, unsafe or dangerous condition" is which the State has allegedly created.
In any event, at the time appellant originated the Order
to Show Cause against respondent for alleged failure to comply
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with the Order of Immediate Occupancy, the access was completed and obviously complied with the Order of Immediate
Occupancy.

If appellant means the lack of deceleration lanes,

left turn storage lane and other things relating to the highway itself which he requested, it is respectfully submitted
that appellant knew when he wrote his letters of March 23,
1971, (R. 36-38) and May 29, 1971, (R. 39, 40) what would be
constructed and how traffic would be handled and that these
requests could not be accommodated.

The record reveals that

while there may have been temporary problems during the construction of the frontage road prior to its use as a detour, there
is no showing that the completed frontage road, or accesses to
appellant's property were "defective, unsafe or a dangerous
condition. "

. ^:-:/:?v ~ ^••'-,

Furthermore, if the damage which appellant allegedly
sustained is due to impairment of access, this is not compensable.

(See statement from People v. Ayon, Supra, Page 24.)

«

It is respectfully submitted that if there are damages
as a result of the access questions, they originate from allegedly inadequate access for a commercial enterprise which
is reliant on convenience.

(

They are not the result of a

"defective, unsafe or dangerous condition."

If the condition

ever, in fact, did exist, it was the result of a temporary

i

condition which was unavoidable and which was adequately corrected on November 15, 1971.

This temporary situation was

one not unique to appellant, but was suffered by other prop-
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*

erty owners in the vicinity.

The courts have held as a

general rule that damage suffered by a property owner must
be special and unique to him and not a damage or inconvenience suffered by all residents in the area.

In the case of

Liebarger v. State Department of Roads, 128 N.W.2d 132 (Neb.
1964), the court stated:
"In the present cause the
plaintiffs seek to recover for
the temporary presence of road
working machinery and rubble
which is to take place after
condemnation the land of the
State and which arises during
the construction of the improvement only. The locality in which
this highway is to go is shown by
plats and aerial photographs herein to be in the thickly populated
urban area. The temporary inconvenience complained of is one
common to all residents and occupants of the vicinity. Evidence
of such elements of damages borne
in common by the neighborhood should
not be admitted upon retrial."
(Emphasis added)
Another court has summed up the lav; on this point in
the case of Masheter v. Yake, 224 N.E.2d 540 at 543 (Ohio
1967), wherein the court states the following:
"Unless unduly prolonged,
mere elements of annoyance,
noise, inconvenience and interference of temporary duration
during the construction of an
improvement and common to the
public are not recoverable as
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damages in an appropriation
action. (Citations omitted)
Not being permanent in nature
they do not last beyond the
completion of the improvement,
have no effect on the market
value of the property before
the improvement, and have no
effect upon the market value
of the residue thereafter,
which market values provide
the outside limits of recovery."
As this court well knows, loss of business profits
are not compensable in an eminent domain proceeding.

Like-

wise certain items of damage are not compensable in a condemnation case.

The court in Kentucky had the following comment

in the case of Commonwealth Department of Highways v. Rayf 392
S.W.2d 666 (Ky. 1965):
it

. . .

To reach the heart of the
problem, we can catalogue
items of damage to which
the landowner is not entitled.
The interference with the
owner's resulting from the
reasonable construction operations, is not a compensable
item." (Emphasis added)

<

Appellant was paid in excess of $211,000/ in the condemnation action.

(R. 61)

This included compensation for land, im-

provements and damages.

He now is seeking a way around govern-

mental immunity to recover damages in areas which he could not
recover for under eminent domain, to wit, "interference from
reasonable construction operations/" "temporary impairment of
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access" and "loss of business profits."

This is so evident

on its fact that the court quite properly dismissed this
count of plaintiff1s Complaint.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of
the trial court to grant respondent's Motion to Dismiss was
and is correct.

The respondent, State Road Commission, is

not bound by unauthorized acts of its employees or agents.
The State's sovereign immunity is waived in certain defined
instances pursuant to the act of the legislature, and the
Attorney General cannot waive this protection.

It cannot

be waived other than by the provisions of the act. The
respondent did not act to waive sovereign immunity and no
request was made by its attorney to waive the act or to obtain permission to bind the respondent to an agreement or
"contract."

It is further submitted that an agreement be-

tween counsel as to the language of a proposed Order to be
submitted to the court for review and for incorporation in
an Order of the court does not create a "contract."

It is

also respectfully submitted that if the actions of respondent's counsel did create a contract, then the consideration
is inadequate to support the so called contract.

Finally,

it is submitted that the access which existed and which now
exists across appellant's property is adequate and at no time

-31Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

could be construed as a "dangerous or defective11 condition
within the meaning and intent of the governmental immunity
act sufficient to remove the protection of sovereign immunity.

For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully sub-

mitted that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

FORD
Assistant Attorney General
115 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
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